The doctrine of double effect

The doctrine of double effect concerns actions that can bring about both an ethically good as well as an ethically bad effect. The doctrine serves to justify cases in which an action that would traditionally be classified as ethically bad may nonetheless be judged ethically permissible or even obligatory. Thomas Aquinas, for example, argued for this doctrine in order to justify acts of killing, even though such acts count as ethically bad in general, in situations of self-defence.

See also:

Aquin, T. v. (1953). Summa Theologica. II–II, 64, 7.(Die deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe, Bd. 18). Styria, Kerle.

Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2019). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Grimm, C, & Hillebrand, I. (2009). Sterbehilfe (Ethik in den Biowissenschaften - Sachstandsberichte des DRZE, Bd. 8). Karl Alber. https://doi.org/10.23769/vka-2020-48345

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